As technology advances towards more connected and digital environments, medical devices are becoming increasingly connected to hospital networks and to the Internet, which exposes them, and thus the patients using them, to new cybersecurity threats. Currently, there is a lack of a methodology dedicated to information security risk assessment for medical devices.
Introduction
As part of the rapid development of medical device technology, medical devices are becoming increasingly connected to hospital networks and even to the Internet, including many devices that have become critical resources in healthcare organizations, such as medical imaging devices (MIDs). Consequently, medical devices today are facing new cyber security threats which include: (1) an increasing potential attack surface due to connection to hospital networks and the Internet; (2) a rising number of outdated and unpatched devices, for which known vulnerabilities that can be easily exploited already exist; (3) ongoing difficulty in updating the devices' software, due to strict regulations which takes too long to comply with (certification was typically given only to the device that included the original hardware and software); (4) lack of awareness and insufficient investment in security among medical device manufacturers, regulatory authorities, healthcare personnel, and patients; and (5) increasing interest in the healthcare industry by cyber warfare's leading players due to the potential high revenue of this domain (e.g., ransomware of expensive or life-supporting devices, or black market trade of highly-priced patients medical records).
Such threats are no longer just the imagination of William Gibson's science fiction stories 1 . In May 2017, the WannaCry ransomware attack [2] [3] [4] spread worldwide, infecting over 200,000 devices in more than 150 countries [5] , including tens of thousands of the UK's National Health Service (NHS) hospitals' devices [6] and MIDs [7] , causing them to be non-operational by encrypting them. This attack caused several hospitals to turn away patients [8, 9] and divert ambulance routes [10] (see appendix § Appendix A for more details). A year earlier, in February 2016, the Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in Los Angeles was hit by another ransomware attack [11, 12] , potentially related to the Locky ransomware [13] , which seized control of the hospital's computer system and encrypted all of its files; the Guardian [14] reported that "the hospital attackers are demanding a ransom of B9,000 Bitcoin (about $3.6 million [at that time]) to decrypt the files", and the hospital eventually "paid a $17,000 ransom" to release the files, as reported by the Los Angeles Times [15] . These examples demonstrate the high financial motivation of criminals to target critical healthcare infrastructure, such as MIDs.
Furthermore, medical devices, such as MIDs and radiation therapy medical devices, could be used maliciously to cause physical harm to patients due to the use of powerful ionizing radiation, strong magnets, gamma radiation, etc. To date, there have been no reports of cyber attacks that caused such physical harm to patients; however, the Therac-25 incident teaches us that this scenario is indeed possible. Therac-25 was a radiation therapy medical device for the treatment of cancer, designed by the AECL 2 ; this device was involved with several incidents of radiation overdose in 1985-1987, which Leveson and Turner [16] reviewed. The device's software contained dangerous vulnerabilities associated with improper safety interlock implementations, which were implemented by software instead of hardware. These vulnerabilities enabled a race condition to occur in certain situations, resulting in patients receiving massive amounts of direct radiation, sometimes a hundred times more than the usual dose. The incident involved at least six patients that suffered severe radiation burns and paralysis of different areas of the body (e.g., hands, legs, and vocal cords), neurogenic bowel and bladder, disorientation, coma, and even death. As far as we know, this incident was not the result of a cyber attack per se; nevertheless, it demonstrates the potential risks of these devices if they are compromised.
Today, reports on cyber attacks and adversarial events targeting medical devices such as MIDs are still not frequent, possibly due to the lack of incentives, lack of federal safe harbor policies, lack of clear, actionable guidance, and lack of meaningful and convenient reporting mechanisms [17] . A publication by Ayala [18] provides general information regarding the security of medical devices, briefly describing several potential attacks. While this is an important initial step towards raising awareness about the security of medical devices, it lacks a methodology for information security risk assessment of these threats.
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) defines information security risk assessment as the: "process to comprehend the nature of risk and to determine the level of risk, [providing] the basis for risk evaluation and decisions about risk treatment [including] risk estimation. . . " [19] . Risk assessment is usually the main part of an overall risk management strategy, which also includes control measures of mitigating the potential risks [20, 21] . The HIPAA 3 , the US legislation for security and privacy of medical information, requires healthcare organizations to "conduct an accurate and thorough assessment of the potential risks and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronically protected health information held by the [organization] ." [22] (HIPAA § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A)). Note that HIPAA does not require the use of a specific information security risk assessment methodology (see § 164.316(b)(1) [22] ). Consequently, many chief information security officers (CISOs) in health maintenance organizations (HMOs) are using common risk assessment methods, which are designed to protect the patients' information rather than the patients' well-being.
Therefore, there is a need for a new methodology for information security risk assessment for medical devices. We believe that the application of the new information security 2 Atomic Energy of Canada Limited 3 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act risk assessment methodology we are proposing, the Threat identification, ontology-based Likelihood, severity Decomposition, and Risk integration (TLDR) methodology, to MIDs, and perhaps to additional medical devices in the future, will pave the way for future research of medical devices security and lead to the development of more secure medical devices.
The main contributions of this study are:
• We present the essential background for our study, including the current state-of-the-art medical devices security and the security challenges for the healthcare industry. • We present the TLDR methodology for information security risk assessment for medical devices, which includes: (1) identifying the potentially vulnerable components of medical devices using Attack Flow Diagrams (AFDs); (2) identifying the potential attacks and marking them on the AFDs; (3) mapping the discovered attacks into their relevant Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classifications (CAPECs); (4) estimating the likelihood of the mapped CAPECs in the medical domain, with the assistance of a panel of senior healthcare Information Security Expert s (ISEs); (5) computing the CAPEC-based likelihood estimates for each attack, using the mean of the ISEs' likelihood estimates of the CAPECs into which the attack is mapped; (6) decomposing each attack into several severity aspects and assigning them weights; (7) assessing the magnitude of the impact of each of the severity aspects for each attack, with the assistance of a panel of Medical Expert s (MEs); (8) computing the composite severity assessments for each attack; and finally, (9) integrating the likelihood and severity of each attack into its risk, and thus prioritizing it. The details of steps six to eight are beyond the scope of the current study and are a part of another study. • We present the application of the TLDR methodology to MIDs:
-We identified the potentially vulnerable components of MIDs by creating four AFDs for the generic MID, a generic computed tomography (CT), a generic magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), and a generic ultrasound; -we identified a total of 23 potential attacks on MIDs: 15 known attacks and eight new attacks that we discovered using the AFDs; -We mapped of all 23 discovered attacks to just eight out of 517 existing CAPEC, and a new, 518 th , CAPEC attack pattern that we suggest adding; -We estimated the likelihood of the nine generic CAPECs with the assistance of our panel of four senior healthcare ISEs and used these estimates to compute the CAPEC-based likelihood estimates of each attack;
-We assessed, for all medical device attacks, the overall severity of each attack 4 with the assistance of a panel of four senior MEs [in this case, radiologists]; and finally, -We integrated the likelihood and severity of each attack into its risk and prioritized the attacks.
• We demonstrated that by using the TLDR methodology, ISEs could reach a [mean] consensus on the relative ranking of the CAPEC-based likelihood estimates of the different attacks, while also maintaining the validity of the risk assessments' absolute values.
To show this, we asked the ISEs to estimate also the direct overall likelihood for each attack individually. We then defined two "consensus" vectors of the 23 potential attacks: (1) the Mean of the Experts' CAPEC-Based Likelihood Estimates (MECBLE) (computed indirectly), and (2) the Mean of the Experts' Direct-Likelihood Estimates (MEDLE). We demonstrated the value and the validity of using the TLDR methodology with respect to the relative ranking of the 23 potential threats, by calculating the pairwise Spearman's correlation between the CAPEC-based (Mean of the Experts' CAPEC-Based Likelihood Estimates (MECBLE)) likelihood estimates and the direct estimates of each of our ISEs, and showing that the correlation is high, while the pairwise correlation between the mean of the direct estimates (the Mean of the Experts' Direct-Likelihood Estimates (MEDLE)) and each of the ISEs' overall direct estimates was lower. We also demonstrated that we maintain the validity of the risk assessment process, by calculating the paired T -test statistic between the CAPEC-based (MECBLE) estimates and the direct ISEs' estimates, and showing that the null hypothesis is accepted (i.e., there was no significant difference between them). This implies that the CAPEC-based (MECBLE) likelihood estimates, using the TLDR methodology, are as valid as current direct risk assessment methodologies' likelihood estimates; however, the CAPEC-based likelihood estimates, computed from the mapped CAPECs, are much easier to calculate.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we provide the essential background ( § 2) for this study, on medical devices security ( § 2.1), information security risk assessment methodologies ( § 2.2), CAPEC mechanism of attack ( § 2.3), and MIDs ( § 2.4). We then present the TLDR methodology for information security risk assessment for medical devices and the evaluation methods of the TLDR methodology ( § 3). We then present the results ( § 4) of the application of the TLDR methodology to MIDs and the validation of its correctness, with a panel of four healthcare ISEs. The TLDR composite severity assessment part of the TLDR methodology, which includes severity decomposition into severity aspects, its assessment, and its validation, is beyond the scope of the current study and will be discussed in a separate paper that we are preparing. Finally, we summarize our study ( § 5), discuss the implications of our results ( § 6), and conclude the study ( § 8). The following supplementary information is provided in the appendices: a description of the WannaCry attack ( § Appendix A), and a list of abbreviations ( § Appendix B).
Background
In this section, we present some essential background for our study. We first discuss the current state of the art of medical devices security ( § 2.1) and stress why MIDs are particularly vulnerable. Following that, we briefly describe currently used information security risk assessment methodologies and define how to calculate the risk of an attack ( § 2.2). We then present the CAPEC mechanism of attack ( § 2.3), which we use in the TLDR methodology in the next section ( § 3). Finally, we present a background on MIDs ( § 2.4).
Medical Device Security
Medical devices are in the process of evolving from analog, standalone, disconnected from the outside world, devices to sophisticated devices with advanced computing and communication capabilities, such as local area network and wireless connectivity, and, in extreme cases, even public cloud connectivity [23] . Whereas these technology advancements have many benefits (e.g., improved patient care), they also poses numerous security vulnerabilities that could be exploited by attackers to create dangerous scenarios for patients such as disabling the device and its services (e.g., ransomware), disrupting the device's proper operation and resources (e.g., battery depletion), tampering with the private data stored and transmitted by the device, etc. Furthermore, wired and wireless connectivity enables remote attacks that do not even require the attackers to be physically close to the targeted device or connected to hospital networks [24] .
For example, by disabling or reprogramming therapies delivered by implanted devices, such as an implantable-cardioverter defibrillator (ICD) with wireless connectivity [25] , researchers were able to induce a shock to the ICD capable of causing ventricular fibrillation (i.e., a fatal heart rhythm) [26] and cause depletion of the battery, rendering the device inoperative [27] and resulting in a situation in which the patient necessitated a surgical procedure to replace the device. Such risks led former US vice president Dick Cheney to disable the wireless capabilities on his ICD in 2007 to avoid being targeted by terrorists [28] . Currently, nothing prevents such remote attacks from finding their way into MIDs as well.
Today, cyber warfare's leading players are groups of cyber terrorists and hacktivists (i.e., politically-driven), cy-ber criminals (i.e., profit-driven), and nation-state supported attackers (i.e., militarily-driven), which do not target information technology (IT) systems exclusively but also target critical infrastructure industries, such as manufacturing, financial services, transportation, government, and healthcare. According to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA): "cyber actors will likely increase cyber intrusions against health care systems -to include medical devices. . . " [29] . In January 2016, the VHA 5 reported [30] blocking more than 76 million intrusion attempts, over 638 million malware-based attacks, more than 99 million malicious emails, and three infected medical devices -in just one month [31] . Hence, it is expected that in the near future, cyber attacks targeting the healthcare industry will become more frequent, more sophisticated, and more dangerous.
MIDs are particularly vulnerable and attractive targets to cyber attacks since they are: (1) connected to hospital networks and in many cases to the Internet, increasing the potential attack surface of attackers; (2) considered critical resources in the healthcare industry, widely used and depended upon in all aspects of health care, from diagnoses of patients' medical conditions to guiding physicians during surgery; (3) very expensive and thus many hospitals can only procure a few MIDs, making then an even more critical resource; (4) very complex, often consisting of an entire ecosystem of components, making the cost of a single MID extremely high; (5) storing and accessing patients' private medical data, exposing them to privacy associated risks (e.g., leakage of confidential data); and (6) accompanied by risks to patients' physical health (e.g., radiation exposure).
A recent paper, Ferrara [32] surveyed cybersecurity in medical imaging and reached similar conclusions. In his paper, Ferrara emphasizes that healthcare organizations are not expected to be completely resistant to cyber attacks; however, they should consider carefully how to manage and mitigate risks. In the next section, we discuss currently used information security risk assessment methodologies and why there is a need for a new information security risk assessment methodology for medical devices.
Information Security Risk Assessment Methodologies
Fenz et al. [33] reviewed commonly used risk assessment methods including the NIST-SP 6 800-30 [34] , the ISO/IEC 27005 [35] by the ISO and the IEC 7 , the OCTAVE 8 [36] , CRAMM 9 , by the UK CCTA 10 [37, 38] , the FAIR 11 [39] , 5 Veterans Health Administration, an entity encompassing hospitals and facilities for US war veterans, serving more than 20 million veterans. 6 National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 7 International Electrotechnical Commission 8 Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation 9 CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method 10 Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency 11 Factor Analysis of Information Risk and the ISAMM 12 [40] . We found that these methods usually consists of the following steps: (1) definition of the potentially vulnerable assets of the organization, (2) identification of the potential threats to these assets, (3) estimation of the likelihood of the identified threats to occur, (4) assessment of the severity (or impact ) of the identified threats if occurred, (5) integration of the risk of the identified threats using the likelihood and severity, and (6) prioritization of threats based on the risk. A conventional method for integrating the risk of potential threats, which we found to appear in most risk assessment methodologies such as those listed above, can be simply defined as follows:
Risk of a threat (e.g., cyber attack) is a function Risk : Likelihood × Severity → Risk, defined in Equation (1):
Where Likelihood represents the probability of the occurrence of the threat, and Severity represents the potential impact of the threat.
Remark 1. The Severity is usually decomposed into confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) aspects.
Remark 2. Although economists and decision analysts use other methods, it is common in the information security community, in which knowledge of likelihoods and impacts is often scarce, to estimate the Likelihood probability and the Severity qualitatively (e.g., using a zero to five scale).
In 2017, Stine et al. [41] proposed a risk scoring system specifically designed for medical devices. Their methodology focuses on decomposing the severity of each attack into five aspects: loss or denial of view, loss or denial of control, manipulation of view, manipulation of control, and denial or manipulation of safety, and qualitatively estimating them. The likelihood of each attack, in their methodology, was fixed to a probability of 1, which the authors justified by following the FDA post-market guidance of using a naive worst-case estimate in the absence of adequate probability data [42] In 2019, Yasqoob et al. [43] proposed an integrated safety, security, and privacy risk assessment framework for medical devices. In their methodology, the authors calculate the risk of specific vulnerabilities based on the CWE 13 database of CVE 14 . They present a non-straightforward approach for estimating the likelihood of CVEs as expanding the traditional CIA, adding a fourth "safety" aspect.
While these methodologies represent important attempts to consider aspects that are specifically designed for medical devices with a human-machine interface, which 12 Information Security Assessment & Monitoring Method 13 Common Weaknesses Enumeration 14 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures most previously mentioned risk assessment methods (that decomposed the severity to only three CIA aspects) lacked -they are not complete. Stine's method lacks an estimation of likelihood. Yasqoob's method is designed for only estimating CVEs' risks, while attacks usually consist of several CVEs; thus, it is not clear how to estimate the risk of sophisticated attacks. The results of both methods were not statistically validated. Nevertheless, these methodologies demonstrate the unique requirements of an information security risk assessment for medical devices in the healthcare industry and strengthen our understanding that a complete and more reasonably accurate means are necessary.
CAPEC: Mechanisms of Attack
The mechanisms of attacks we describe in this study are essentially the attack patterns, which define how the attacks are performed. Attack patterns can be classified using the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) taxonomy by the MITRE Corporation [44] , which already includes 517 different attack patterns well-organized, well-reviewed, and confirmed by the community.
The CAPEC hierarchy is divided into different levels of abstraction: (1) category, a collection of attack patterns based on some common characteristic; (2) meta attack pattern, an abstract characterization of a technique used in an attack; and (3) standard attack pattern, a specific technique used in an attack. Furthermore, many of the attack patterns in CAPEC also include additional useful information, such as:
1. Summary description: a standard description of the attack pattern that defines the weakness of the attack target and the steps performed by the attacker. 2. Attack prerequisites: the necessary conditions for the attack to succeed. 3. Attack severity: range from one (i.e., very low) to five (i.e., very high). 4. Likelihood of attack success: the probability of an attack to succeed, considering target vulnerabilities, prerequisites, required skills, required resources, and the effectiveness of potential mitigation, range from one (i.e., very low) to five (i.e., very high). 5. Methods of attack : the attack vectors that identify the mechanisms used in the attack (e.g., brute force). 6. Specific knowledge or skill required to conduct attack : the specific knowledge or skill required by an attacker to perform the attack, including an indication of the level of knowledge or skill required from 1 to 3. 7. Potential solutions or mitigation: any action or approach that may prevent the attack, reduce the probability, reduce the impact, or mitigate the effects of the attack.
Thus, if we can map attacks on medical devices into CAPEC attack patterns, we will be able to infer the rel-evant information from CAPEC and apply it to these attacks (e.g., potential solutions or mitigation options, which will already exist within the CAPEC attack pattern), or at least use such information as a good starting point.
Medical Imaging Devices (MIDs)
Medical imaging is a broad field associated with creating a visual representation of the human body and internal tissues, using advanced technologies to diagnose, monitor, treat, manage, or study medical conditions [45] . Different imaging technologies produce different results regarding the area of the body being inspected or treated; thus, medical imaging provides physicians with a vast amount of information about patients' medical conditions and the effectiveness of medical treatment [46] . Medical imaging is used extensively throughout the healthcare system and patient lifespan, from prenatal imaging to geriatrics, encompassing personal imaging to population imaging, emergency care to chronic care, and treatment of various patients such as oncologic patients.
MIDs are composed of very sophisticated detectors that can measure the effects of various signals which are used to produce medical images. The type of equipment used in each MID is referred to as the modality, and the type of signal depends on the modality. Unlike regular cameras (e.g., digital cameras), MIDs do not usually detect visible light. Instead, they detect other signals, such as magnetic field resonance, X-rays, gamma rays, ultrasonic waves, etc., which reveal the internal structures of the human body. Each type of signal affects various tissues differently, providing diverse information about the area of the body being studied or treated; this information can be related to possible disease, injury, or the effectiveness of medical treatment.
MIDs can measure the effects of signals produced by the MID itself or signals transmitted naturally from the patient or preinjected material. The latter can be done in most imaging exams by using substances that absorb or change the signals produced by the MID, or, by particular radiation-emitting substances that are injected into the patient's body before the scan. Also, intravenous injections of iodinated contrast are often used for enhanced anatomical and functional assessment of various organs [47] . The FDA has indicated that this exposes patients to potential risks associated with possible reactions to the agent [48] . Figure 1 presents the main MIDs currently used by healthcare facilities worldwide. Each modality has its applications and technology: X-rays are used in CT, radio frequency (RF) is used in MRI [49] , gamma rays are used in nuclear medicine, and high-frequency sound waves are used in ultrasound. In the context of patient safety, a property shared by all modalities is the trade-off between the power of the projected energy, emitted by the device or modality, and its impact on patient safety and the quality of the image: a high X-ray dose, long magnetic resonance time, or high ultrasound power may improve the quality of the image; however, it may damage the tissue being scanned and harm the patient. The cost of MIDs and their technologies range from a few thousand dollars (e.g., ultrasound) to a few million dollars. X-ray Generator. X-ray generators produce radiographic images by projecting short X-ray pulses through the patient using electromagnetic energy sources and measuring the X-ray waves passing from the patient (i.e., after passing through the patient) using X-ray detectors. Different tissue such as bone, soft tissue, and air inside the patient result in a heterogeneous distribution of X-rays that creates the image [50] . The X-ray's detector might be a computed radiography cassette, where photo-stimulated luminescence screens capture the X-rays and transform them into digital form [51] , or digital radiography (DR), where images are directly transformed into digital form; this makes DR scans faster, accurate, and radiation dose effective (i.e., use the minimal radiation dose, above which there is no significant improvement in quality). The unique properties of X-ray technology, such as projecting densities of different tissues on the image, makes X-ray use very popular in many medical domains, such as diagnosis of bone fractures, lung pathologies (including cancer), or dental diagnosis. X-ray radiation is ionizing, with enough energy to potentially cause damage to the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) structure of different organic tissues. Potential risks from exposure to such ionizing radiation include damage to tissues and skin or increased risk of cancer. The actual radiation risks of different organs and tissues vary according to their different sensitivity to radiation exposure [52] .
Computed tomography (CT). CT is an essential and popular X-ray generator modality ( § 2.4). CT images are produced by passing X-ray waves through the body at various angles; these X-ray waves are emitted from X-ray tubes rotating around the patient's body, producing many slices (two-dimensional images of a three-dimensional organ). Arrays of detectors located opposite the X-ray tubes measure the exiting X-ray waves in analog form, and then the data is reconstructed into digital images using a computer. Similar to the X-ray generator ( § 2.4), CT modalities produce ionizing radiation and thus may be dangerous [47] . This unique imaging technique enables the production of high-resolution images, making CT a favorite, significant, and critical resource for the diagnosis of many medical conditions, such as emergency diagnosis of a subdural hematoma, ruptured disks, aneurysms, and other pathologies. CT modalities are very expensive; the cost depends on the number of detectors that the modality has (e.g., 16 slices, 64 slices, 128 slices, and even 256 slices).
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). MRI uses magnetic fields to create RF effects, which are measured to produce images. During the scan, the patient is positioned inside a scanner tube which, consists of a magnet (currently a superconducting magnet is usually used), which produces strong magnetic fields (about 10,000 to 60,000 times stronger than the earth's magnetic field) around the patient. The magnetic field aligns protons (i.e., hydrogen atoms) inside water molecules contained in different tissues of the patient. RF pulses are used to excite the protons and move them from their precessional frequency. When the protons return to their original position, they emit RF radiation, which is then measured by the MRI modality. Each tissue has a different proton resonance frequency; therefore, by measuring the RF emitted, the MRI modality can reconstruct an image that represents internal tissues. Since protons exist in water molecules, MRI achieves the best results when diagnosing soft tissues, rich with hydrogen atoms. Hence, it is popular for neurological imaging, as well as musculoskeletal imaging. MRI modalities are expensive, usually even more expensive than CT modalities, due to the cost of the magnet; thus, in many hospitals, only a few MRI modalities are installed. To improve the accuracy, the process of aligning the protons using the magnetic field and measuring the emitted RF radiation is repeated several times, making MRI scans longer in duration than CT scans (i.e., several minutes compared to several seconds). Because of this, MRI scans may not be appropriate for individual patients, such as pediatric patients and patients that are unable to hold still for some time. Moreover, the use of large magnetic fields prevents patients with pacemakers or other metal implants from getting MRI scans. Although MRI does not emit ionizing radiation [53] , the combination of static gradient magnetic fields and RF radiation during MRI scans may generate heat and harm a patient's tissues or cause damage to the patient's DNA structure [49] .
Ultrasound. Ultrasound uses a short duration of high-frequency sound waves, which are generated and transmitted into the patient's body. The waves are then reflected to the device by the internal structures of the body, creating echoes. These echoes are reconstructed into a linear array of tomographic slices of the tissues of interest, showing the motion of the tissues (e.g., fetus movements). Ultrasound imaging is preferred in obstetrical patients to monitor the fetus during pregnancy, making ultrasound modalities common in a hospital's OB/GYN 15 , and maternal care departments. However, since sound waves do 15 obstetrics and gynecology not travel well in air and bones, ultrasound is more limited compared to X-ray generators, CT, or MRI.
Nuclear Medicine. Nuclear medicine uses a chemical substance containing a radioactive isotope and measures the radioactive decay of the isotope, which is emitted in the form of gamma radiation, in order to produce the image. The isotope is given to the patient before the exam orally, by injection, or by inhalation, and the exam begins once the agent (i.e., the isotope) has distributed itself according to the physiological status of the patient. The most popular nuclear medicine techniques are gamma cameras: single-photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) and positron-emission tomography (PET) [50] . These technologies are often used in neurological and cardiac imaging. Hybrid imaging allows combining SPECT and PET technologies with CT and MRI into one modality, such as SPECT/CT, SPECT/MRI [54] , PET/CT, or PET/MRI [55] . Hybrid imaging usually produces enhanced results due to the combination of different technologies. For example, in the cardiac domain, SPECT/CT imaging is used to image the heart at rest and during exercise to evaluate the heart's blood flow, which helps detect narrowing of the arteries [56] . Similarly, PET/CT imaging is used for diagnosing the effectiveness of chemotherapy in cancer or diagnosing the effectiveness of glucose metabolism.
The TLDR Methodology
In this section, we present the Threat identification, ontology-based Likelihood, severity Decomposition, and Risk integration (TLDR) 16 methodology for information security risk assessment for medical devices. Note that the D part of the TLDR methodology ( § 3.6 to § 3.8) is beyond the scope of the current study and will be discussed in a separate paper that we are preparing.
Identifying the Potentially Vulnerable Components
Using AFDs
The first step of the TLDR methodology for information security risk assessment for medical devices is identifying the potentially vulnerable components using Attack Flow Diagrams (AFDs), which are diagrams of medical devices, consisting of their main components, and Information Flow Vector s (IFVs) between these components. On each IFV, we will mark in the next step ( § 3.2) the IDs of all attacks that potentially utilize the IFV as part of the attack. This helps to visualize, for each device: (1) its main components, (2) the information flow between these components, (3) all its relevant attacks, and (4) the potential flow of these attacks. This approach is based on the data flow diagram, a widely used methodology for graphically representing the data flow inside complex information systems [57] . The AFD symbols are self-explanatory; nevertheless, a detailed legend of the symbols is provided in Table 1 .
In addition to creating AFDs for specific medical devices (e.g., CT), it is possible to create AFDs for generic medical devices. For example, we have created an AFD for the generic MID that consists of components that typically appear in most MIDs. Defining a generic medical device is useful for many purposes, such as for (1) describing attacks targeting the surrounding components of the medical device; (2) consolidating basic attack scenarios which potentially target any wide variety of medical devices; (3) de- 
Shape Description
Component A fundamental component that represents a process (or several processes) that performs a well-defined operation.
Subcomponent
A subcomponent is a component that is further expanded into an additional AFD.
Terminator A terminator is a component which represents a beginning or termination of the flow.
Network
A network represents an abstract structure of several connected components, such as the Internet or internal hospital networks.
Logical Encapsulation
A logical encapsulation represents an encapsulation of several components, separating them from outer components. Outer components can consider the logical encapsulation as a "black box" with well-defined inputs and outputs for interaction.
Outer Component
An outer component is a component which is not directly a part of the analyzed device, usually outside a logical encapsulator.
A directed edge is a potential IFV between two components.
A bold edge is a directed edge that takes part in an attack; thus, on this edge, we mark the discovered attacks' IDs (see § 3.2), using blue to represent IDs of existing attacks, and red to represent IDs of new attacks that we have discovered.
Bold numbers represent IDs of newly discovered attacks (with regards to previously identified attacks in the TLDR methodology), which are only relevant to the current medical device, marked on edge previously introduced in another AFD (e.g., the AFD of the generic MID).
scribing attacks on medical devices for which we did not find unique attacks; (4) lay the groundwork for advanced attack scenarios of specific medical devices; and (5) provide a solid foundation for future research to expand the abstract AFD for additional unique modalities.
Identifying the Potential Attacks and Marking Them on the AFDs
The second step of the TLDR methodology includes identifying all the potential attacks and marking them on the AFDs ( § 3.2). For this step, using AFDs becomes very useful for identifying vulnerabilities as well as visualizing the attacks. First, we shall mark, in blue, all known attacks, such as attacks that may already happen or that have been mentioned in the literature. Next, we shall mark, in red, newly identified potential attacks that have been discovered as a result of using our AFDs. Given the nature of cyber attacks' rapid development and constant change, this step will require additional updates from time to time (e.g., once new potential attacks are discovered).
Mapping the Discovered Attacks into Their Relevant CAPECs
This step includes the mapping of each attack, which was discovered in the previous step, into all relevant CAPECs that describe the attack or can potentially implement it. Since CAPEC provides standard definitions of many attack patterns, we plan that this mapping would be from many potential attacks into a significantly smaller number of CAPECs. Furthermore, since the domain of MIDs is unique, CAPEC may be missing a few patterns which are unique for cyber attacks on MIDs; in such cases, we shall suggest adding the missing patterns to CAPEC.
Estimating the Likelihood of the Generic CAPECs into Which the Potential Attacks Are Mapped
CAPEC provides a rough estimate of the overall likelihood (see § 2.3) to most of its attack patterns; however, these estimates are too general for the unique medical domain, and thus, may not be accurate enough for us. To fine-tune CAPEC's likelihood estimates, we re-estimate these values with the assistance of a panel of four healthcare ISEs who specialize in medical devices' security. Users of the TLDR methodology are welcome to fine-tune our estimates with the assistance of their own experts, to get even more accurate results, specific for their organizations. Simply ask your experts to re-estimate the likelihood of each of the CAPECs and plug it into the tables we present in the results chapter ( § 4). New attack incidents may provide new insights that would require to update the likelihood estimates from time to time.
Computing the CAPEC-based Likelihood Estimates for Each Attack
Finally, we compute the CAPEC-based (i.e., overall) likelihood estimates for each attack as the mean of the likelihood estimates, given in § 3.4, of the relevant CAPECs into which the potential attacks had been mapped in § 3.3. Note that just like in Fuzzy Logic, one could argue that the worst-case scenario should be considered by taking the maximum likelihood of the relevant CAPECs, rather than the mean likelihood, assuming that the attacker is aware of everything that we are, as Stine et al. [41] did in their risk scoring system (see § 2.2); however, we assume that an attacker choice of a potential CAPEC is not based solely on the likelihood of the CAPEC, since an attacker might have other reasons to choose a potential CAPECs (e.g., an attacker lacks knowledge or resources required to implement the CAPEC). Thus, we assume that all potential CAPECs mapped to an attack are equally likely, implying a mean likelihood of the mapped CAPECs of the attack as the computed likelihood estimates of the attack. Note that a constant shift c may be added (see § 4.10).
Decomposing Each Attack into Several Severity Aspects and Assigning Them Weights
The severity of attacks is usually decomposed into specific aspects that affect the organization (e.g., CIA is used in traditional risk assessment methodologies, see § 2.2). The decomposed severity aspects do not affect the organization equally; thus, we can assign predetermined relative importance weights for each decomposed severity aspect, based on the organization's policy. The defined decomposed severity aspects and their weights will then be used as predefined default weights throughout the TLDR methodology. New attack incidents may provide new insights that would require to update the weights from time to time. Note that both the relative importance weights and the specific magnitudes of the impact of the severity aspects, represent measures of [dis]utility, and are entirely different from the likelihood, which represents a measure of probability.
In the current study, we are focusing on obtaining the TLDR methodology's likelihood estimates for each attack. The severity decomposition steps of the TLDR methodology and their validation are beyond the scope of the current study and are discussed in a separate paper that we are preparing. One can view our use of the TLDR methodology in the current study as using a trivial decomposition of the severity into a single-aspect severity -i.e., the overall severity -and assigning it a weight of one.
Assessing the Magnitude of the Impact of Each of the
Severity Aspects for Each Attack One can interpret the severity as the expected magnitude of the impact, denoting the assessment of the level, or degree, of damage assuming the attack was successful. For example, one could envision the ordinal scale as being "None, Very Low, Low, Moderate, High, Very High."
We assess the expected magnitude of the impact of each of the decomposed severity aspects [in this particular study, we used only single-aspect severity -the overall severity -since this part is beyond the scope of the current study], for each attack individually on a scale of zero to five, with the assistance of a panel of MEs. Users of the TLDR methodology can fine-tune our assessments with their own experts by re-assessing the severity with the assistance of their own experts, to get even more accurate results, specific for their organizations, and plug it into the tables we present in the results chapter ( § 4). New attack incidents may provide new insights that would also require to update the expected magnitude of the impact of severity aspects.
Computing the Composite Severity Assessments for Each Attack
We compute the composite severity assessments for each attack as the weighted sum of the magnitude of the impact of the decomposed severity aspects for each attack, weighted by the organization-specific relative importance weights of these aspects, as defined in Eq. (2):
Where m is the number of decomposed severity aspects, w i is the normalized relative importance weight of the i th decomposed severity aspect, s i,j is the assessment of the expected magnitude (degree) of the impact of the i th decomposed severity aspect for the j th specific attack, and c is a constant shift that may be added (see § 4.10).
Note that the validation of this step is beyond the scope of the current study, in which we simply used the experts' the overall severity assessments for each attack. This simplification can be viewed as using the TLDR methodology with only single-aspect severity for each attack, with a weight of one.
Integrating the Likelihood and Severity of Each Attack into Its Risk and Prioritizing It
We integrate the risk for each attack based on Eq. (1) (see § 2.2), using the CAPEC-based likelihood estimates ( § 3.5) and the composite severity assessments ( § 3.8). The attacks' risks can now be used to prioritize the attacks from the defenders' perspective.
Validating the TLDR Methodology's Results
To validate our results, we followed the same steps as the TLDR methodology; however, we asked the ISEs to estimate also the direct overall likelihood for each attack individually, instead of using the TLDR methodology. We then defined two "consensus" vectors of the 23 potential attacks: (1) the Mean of the Experts' CAPEC-Based Likelihood Estimates (MECBLE) (computed indirectly), and (2) the Mean of the Experts' Direct-Likelihood Estimates (MEDLE). To demonstrate the value and the validity of using the TLDR methodology with respect to the relative ranking of the 23 potential threats, we calculated the pairwise Spearman's correlation between the CAPEC-based (MECBLE) likelihood estimates and the direct estimates of each of our ISEs and showed that the correlation is high, while the pairwise correlation between the mean of the direct estimates (the MEDLE) and each of the ISEs' overall direct estimates was lower. To demonstrate that we maintained the validity of the risk assessment process, we calculated the paired T -test statistic between the CAPEC-based (MECBLE) estimates and the direct ISEs' estimates, and showed that the null hypothesis is accepted (i.e., there was no significant difference between them). This implies that the CAPEC-based (MECBLE) likelihood estimates, using the TLDR methodology, are as valid as current direct risk assessment methodologies' likelihood estimates; however, the CAPEC-based likelihood estimates, computed from the mapped CAPECs, are much easier to calculate. Note that we asked the ISEs to directly estimate the likelihood of each attack individually before we ask them to estimate it using the TLDR methodology to eliminate a potential biased point of reference.
We shall also validate that the mapping of the discovered attacks into their relevant CAPECs, indeed results in a mapping of many attacks into a significantly smaller number of CAPECs. This, together with good correlations, will demonstrate, at least statistically, that instead of asking a panel of healthcare ISEs to estimate the likelihood for each attack directly, we can only ask them to estimate just a relatively small number of general CAPEC likelihoods to achieve similar outcomes. Also, we shall validate that using the AFDs, which helps discover new attacks by measuring the number of newly discovered attacks.
Results
In this section, we present the results of the application of the TLDR methodology (see § 3) to MIDs. We first present the Threat identification (T) part of the TLDR methodology: creating the AFDs of MIDs, which helps us identify the potentially vulnerable components ( § 4.1) and identify 23 potential attacks on MIDs ( § 4.2). Following that, we present the ontology-based Likelihood (L) part of the TLDR methodology: mapping of the discovered attacks into their relevant CAPECs ( § 4.3), estimating the likelihood of each CAPEC with the assistance of the panel of healthcare ISEs' ( § 4.4), and computing the CAPEC-based likelihood estimates for each attack ( § 4.5). As mentioned before, the severity Decomposition (D) part of the TLDR methodology ( § 3.6 to § 3.8) is beyond the scope of the current study and will be discussed in a separate paper that we are preparing; thus, we replaced these steps with a single simple step of assessing the overall severity for each attack with the assistance of the panel of Radiology Medical Expert s (RMEs) ( § 4.7) and used it as its severity. Following that, we present the Risk integration (R) part of the TLDR methodology: integrating the risk for each attack and prioritizing it ( § 4.9). The results are summarized in Table 2 . Finally, we validate the TLDR methodology's results ( § 4.10) using statistical metrics, such as the paired T -test and pairwise Spearman's correlation.
Identifying the Potentially Vulnerable Components Using AFDs
Following the TLDR methodology, we begin with identifying the potentially vulnerable components of MIDs using AFDs. In this section, we create the AFDs of the generic MIDs (see Figure 3 ), generic CT (see Figure 4 ), generic MRI (see Figure 5 ), and generic ultrasound (see Figure 6 ). Note that we already marked the potential attacks, which we identify in the following subsection. For each AFD of MID, we describe the presented components and the data flow inside the MID. 
MID Control (1),(7),(9),(11) 
F2. Internet
Update EMR (1),(2)
Read EMR (1),(2),(3), (11) 
Hospital's Internet Output (5) Hospital's Internet Input (1) Host's Remote Control (1),(6), (7), (9), (11) Host's Output (1), (2) database: archives all patients' images. The communication with it is done using the Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine (DICOM) protocol. H. Medical doctor: specifies the required scan for the patient, evaluates the results, and can access the imaging results from any workstation in the hospital. The flow begins with the medical doctor (H) requesting the scan from his office via a workstation in the hospital's network (F), which is then uploaded to the EMR system. Once the patient (A) arrives to have the scan, the technician (E) extracts the scan request manually (i.e., by physically viewing it) from the EMR PC (B5) and configures the host control PC (D) accordingly. Then, he connects the patient (A) to complementary devices (B) by placing the patient (A) on the mechanical bed (B1) and connecting him to the CIS (B2), and the patient monitoring systems (B3). When the technician (E) initiates the scan, the host control PC (D) sends control signals to the MID (C), the mechanical bed (B1), and the CIS (B2), and receives feedback from the MID (C) and the patient monitoring systems (B3). The received feedback is presented on the primary monitor (B4).
At the top of the AFD, we present the interactions with the patient (A). In case of problems or potential danger, the technician (E) can apply various safety mechanisms and stop the scanning process. The scan results are collected via the host control PC (D) and sent to the PACS database (G), which is accessible to the medical doctor (H) via the hospital's network (F1). Often, the raw data (i.e., before reconstruction 20 ) is stored internally by the MID (C) and is also accessible to the medical doctor (H).
It is important to note that today, MIDs are connected directly to the Internet (F2) [62] in various ways, such as directly to the manufacturer for monitoring, troubleshooting, and more [63] , or via the PACS server (G) inside the hospital's internal network (F1), which is usually connected to the Internet (F2). Although these interactions are not part of the MID ecosystem, such connections make MIDs very vulnerable since they enable potential access for attackers from anywhere in the world. 
D. Host Control PC F2. Internet

MID's Input VPN from the Manufacturers
(1),(7),(9),(11) (10), (17) MID's Monitoring VPN to the Manufacturers (1),(6),(7),(9) (5), (10) MID Control (1),(7),(9),(11), (12),(13), (14) , (16) (10), (17) Medical Results & Monitoring (3),(6),(7) (8), (17) IRS Control (1),(7),(9),(11), (15) (10),(18) Figure 4 : The AFD of the generic CT with the relevant IFVs and attack vectors, based on [64, 65] , which represents digital X-ray generators as well, due to their resemblance of CTs.
The AFD of the Generic CT. The AFD of the generic CT includes the following components: a. X-ray source emits ionizing radiation. b. Gantry: the mechanical device that controls the X-ray source, including the X-ray detectors, which measure the output radiation. In CT, the patient lays inside the tube containing the X-ray sources and detectors. In some cases, manufacturers open a VPN connection from the Internet for monitoring purposes. 20 Processing raw analog signal measurements into digital images.
c. Image Reconstruction System (IRS): the computer that collects the raw data of the image, produced by the gantry's radiation measures during the scan, and reconstructs it into DICOM images, which are sent to the host control PC. Once the scan is initiated, the host control PC (D) sends commands to the gantry (b), which controls the X-ray source (a) and measures the X-ray effects from the patient (A). The gantry (b) sends the raw results to the IRS (c), via the host control PC (D) or directly in some devices, for reconstruction. 21 The reconstructed image is then sent to the host control PC (D), and the flow continues as it did in Figure 3 , including the interactions with the Internet (F2). The gantry's (b) inner components breakdown is out of the scope of the current study. The AFD of the Generic MRI. The AFD of the generic MRI includes the following components: a. Front-end controller: sometimes referred to as the pulse programmer, translates and forwards commands to control signals for different components (e.g., magnets, gradient systems, RF system, etc.). b. RF modulator & amplifier: generates RF pulses from the synthesizer and monitors specific absorption rate limits, 22 preventing an overpowered scan from taking place. This expensive component can amplify signals from 10 kW to an order of 16 kW. c. Gradient system: linearly varies the direction of the magnetic field to implement pulse sequences. d. Synthesizer: generates an RF (i.e., the center frequency), which is used in the demodulation of the received signal to centralize it around zero. Without the synthesizer, the center frequency may differ from one patient to another, which may cause inaccurate results. e. MRI coils: e1. Gradient coil: generates three orthogonal linear magnetic field gradients, varying the magnetic field for spatially encoding of the magnetic resonance (MR) signal's location. It is mounted on a cylindrical former inside the bore of the magnet. The higher the maximum gradient amplitude, the smaller the field of view, and the thinner the slice widths. Several specialized scanning techniques (e.g., diffusion imaging) require high peak gradient amplitudes. e2. Superconducting magnet: the main component of the MRI, with magnetic field strength (i.e., flux density) of 1.5 T to 3 T for clinical use, and over 3 T for research purposes. The higher the magnetic field strength, the better the SNR 23 (i.e., the better the image quality) is; therefore, the SNR is the most useful image quality parameter. The homogeneity of the magnetic field is another crucial factor, which is measured in parts per million within a given spherical volume, defined as the diameter spherical volume. There are four main types of magnets used in MRIs: air-cored, iron-cored (i.e., electromagnet), permanent, and superconducting, which is the most popular today. Superconducting magnets are held at temperatures that approach absolute zero (−273.13 • C or 0 K) to allow zero electrical resistance. To achieve that, these magnets are held in a cryogenic bath (i.e., liquid helium) at less than 4.2 K. When a problem occurs, and the magnet needs to be turned off immediately, the magnet can be put in quench state, and the liquid helium, keeping the magnet cold, is released, causing the magnet to stop functioning altogether. e3. RF coil: used to transmit and receive RF signals, where the transmission must be a homogeneous RF magnetic field. e4. Surface coil: a physical coil that is placed directly 22 The potential for heating the patient's tissue due to the application of the RF energy. 23 signal to noise ratio over the anatomical region of interest for better signal reception. e5. Safety sensors: alerts about dangerous situations.
They include thermal and oxygen level sensors, which alert about abnormal temperature and dangerous depletion of oxygen, which may happen when there is a helium gas leak from the quench pipe. f. RF screen: acts as a Faraday cage to reduce the extended fringe field from the magnet and the interference from external transmitters. g. Quadrature demodulator & IRS: boosts signals detected from the surface coils, mixes them with the RF from the synthesizer, converts the analog raw data into digital data, and reconstructs the image. The flow begins when the MRI enters the initialization stage, which includes tuning the components. When a scan configuration is entered, the host control PC (D) verifies that the values are within the hardware limits (e.g., maximum gradient strength) or software limits (e.g., the maximum number of slices). Afterward, the commands are sent to the front-end controller (a), which translates and forwards the commands to the gradient system (c), the synthesizer (d), the magnet (e2), and the RF coil (e3). The RF modulator (b) verifies that the RF signal is within a safe range, and the gradient system (c) creates the gradient field.
The internal flow inside the MRI's gantry (which is presented as a logical encapsulation) begins when the gradient coil (e1) generates the magnetic field gradients for spatially encoding the location of the MR signal. The magnet (e2) produces the magnetic field, and the RF coil (e3) measures the RF radiation emitted from the patient (A) and sends raw results to the IRS (g) for reconstruction. Note that the synthesizer (d) is also connected to the IRS (g) for the initial tuning of the signals. The surface coil (e4) is used to increase signal reception. The RF screen (f) protects the coils from the outside RF signals, which may interfere with the results. The reconstructed images are sent back to the host control PC (D), and the flows continue as it did in Figure 3 .
The AFD of the Generic Ultrasound. The AFD of the generic ultrasound includes the following components: a. Transducer: a physical component that transmits ultrasonic signals and measures the time between the transmission and reception. This component can be divided into transmit and receive transducers. b. Transmit/receive switches: control when the transducer will transmit and when it will receive since the transducer performs both functions. c. Analog signal processing: reconstructs the image using the analog ultrasonic signals detected (similar to the IRS 
Identifying the Potential Attacks and Marking Them on the AFDs
In this section, we provide a detailed description of each of the 23 potential attacks that we have found. We list the attacks based on the relevant MID that it affects.
Generic MID Attacks.
Attack 1 (Ransomware [2-12, 14, 15, 58] ). Since MIDs rely on computers to operate, ransomware attacks (CAPEC 542) such as the WannaCry cyber attack (see § Appendix A) mentioned earlier, can lock the host control PC and make the MID nonoperational, damaging the availability on a large scale. Also, it can encrypt the scan results or essential system files in critical situations and may put patients at risk. New ransomware attacks may also involve malicious firmware updates of various components of the MID. In those cases, cleaning the host PC will not restore the system. Attack 2 (Disruption of patient-to-image linkage [18, 58] ). The scan results are linked to the specific EMR of the patient being scanned. Linking different results and patient information to specific patients is done inside the host control PC, and the linked results are sent to the PACS server using the DICOM protocol. Targeted malware (CAPEC 542) resident on the host control PC can disrupt these linkages (CAPEC 165), by either linking the result to the wrong patient or relating the wrong results to the patient being scanned. This attack is sophisticated and requires specific insider knowledge (CAPEC 150). This attack can affect many patients (i.e., scale), causing incorrect diagnosis of patients, improper treatment, and privacy issues. This attack is technically similar to Attack 3 (Alteration of the imaging exam's results [58] [59] [60] ).
Attack 3 (Alteration of the imaging exam's results [58] [59] [60] ). The attacker attempts to alter the output image of the imaging exam in order either to hide a medical condition (e.g., remove a dangerous tumor) or to deceive (e.g., inject a nonexistent tumor), leading to improper treatment of patients. Since patients often receive treatment based on the imaging results, the outcome of such an attack can be very dangerous, including direct physical harm to patients, which could be fatal in some cases. Furthermore, if performed well, it is very challenging to detect the attack and notice that something is wrong; thus, an attacker could create a small change in the image for all patients, which may have no significant influence on the patient in the short run but could damage the health of many patients (i.e., scale) in the long run.
Attack 4 (Contrast material over/underdose). The CIS is often used in MID exams in order to inject different contrast materials and enhance the scan's results. The CIS is a mechanical system that is connected to the patient's blood system and remotely operated via a special control unit or the host control PC. The CIS is semi-automatically activated by the technician and the host control PC during the exam. Targeted malware (CAPEC 542) resident on the host control PC can manipulate the amount of contrast material injected. The severity of this attack may result in disrupted exam results due to incorrect contrast material dose and potential adverse side effects to the patient due to over-injection of the contrast material (e.g., overdose with potential toxicity). In addition, misuse of this system may damage it.
Attack 5 (Leakage of patients' private information).
MIDs have access to sensitive private information that enables patient identification, as well as the patient's EMR, in order to link the exam results to the patient's EMR. In addition, MIDs are connected to the hospital's network, and in many cases, are connected directly to the manufacturer's monitoring systems via the Internet. This makes MIDs a potential gateway for leakage of patients' sensitive private information such as exam results or other private information that the MID has access to. Also, this attack may leak private information of many patients (i.e., scale).
Attack 6 (Manipulation of data displayed on the host's monitor [18] ). The host's monitor is the primary monitor that the technician uses during the scan. This attack is similar to Attack 9 (Activate false safety alarms [18] ), however, in addition, it displays all of the information related to the scan, the patient, and the MID, such as the scan's configurations and results, the patient's physical condition, and the control and configuration panel of the MID. The severity of this attack is only related to the patient. A targeted malware may present false information to the monitor, which may be completely different from the real information (e.g., a normal heart rate while the actual heart rate is high, or vice versa), in order to influence the scan, affecting the physical condition of the patient as well as the diagnosis. Such malware can easily evade detection; hence, it may affect many patients before being discovered.
Attack 7 (Mute safety alarms [18] ). Technically similar to Attack 9 (Activate false safety alarms [18] ); however, in this attack, instead of activating false alarms, the attacker tries to mute safety alarms. This may prevent the MID from being automatically or manually stopped if a dangerous situation occurs, which could be fatal.
Attack 8 (Disruption of the imaging exam's results [58] ). Technically similar to Attack 3 (Alteration of the imaging exam's results [58] [59] [60] ); however, this attack focuses merely on disrupting the exam's results, possibly requiring repeating the exam. The attacker can do so by manipulating files (CAPEC 165) and common resources (CAPEC 150) or by jamming (CAPEC 601) and disabling the route of the output image (CAPEC 582), which interferes with patient diagnosis. While this attack may not always be severe, in cases that require immediate care to the patient, even the briefest delay may be fatal.
Attack 9 (Activate false safety alarms [18] ). Most MIDs include various safety alarms and monitors, such as fire alarms, oxygen alarms, heart rate monitors, blood pressure monitors, etc. These alarms include sensors that are configured to automatically stop the MID's operation in case of a problem or issue and alert the technician to turn off the MID manually. Some alarm systems include standalone alarms (e.g., a red light or speaker), which are more challenging to activate. However, some alarms are connected to a centralized computer, such as the host control PC, or other computers in the MID's ecosystem. A targeted malware (CAPEC 542) on such a computer can activate false alarms to cause the MID to automatically or manually (by the technician) stop during treatment (e.g., interventional radiology), which may put the patient at increased risk. In some cases, such operation could also damage the device itself, affecting its availability. This attack pattern uses environment hardware and sensors (our new attack pattern: CAPEC NEW Manipulate Environment Hardware or Sensors), as well as additional obstruction (CAPEC-607: Obstruction) 24 attack patterns: disabling the route to/from the alarm or the sensor (CAPEC 582), jamming alarms that use RF communication (CAPEC 601), and blockage of alarm or sensor (CAPEC 603). The severity of such an attack range from damage to the MID to physical harm to the patient.
Attack 10 (Mechanical disruption of MID's motors [58] ). MID ecosystems include several components with mechanical motors: mechanical bed motors, scanner motors, rotation motors, etc. The motors receive instructions from a control unit (e.g., the host control PC). Targeted malware (CAPEC 542) can change the commands controlling these motors (i.e., CAPEC NEW: manipulate environment hardware or sensors), causing an undesired change in the movement of these motors. By misusing the motors, this attack can directly damage the device, possibly wrecking the motors and damaging their availability and the availability of the MID. Also, since these motors physically interact with the patient, this attack may potentially harm the patient by making the motors move in a way that hurts the patient.
Attack 11 (Restore system [18] ). This attack attempts to use the system restore option (CAPEC 166) found in most computers in MID ecosystems (e.g., the host control PC) or externally restore the system to factory default configurations. This attack may cause a loss of data (e.g., scan results) or a loss of custom configurations set by the technician. This may affect the availability of the device, resulting in delayed treatment for patients.
Generic CT Attacks.
Attack 12 (Increase milliamperage-seconds [mAs] [18, 58] ). Similar to Attack 13 (Increase kilovoltage peak [kVp] [18, 58] ); however, this attack targets another specific parameter of the radiation. This parameter measures the radiation produced [mA] over a set of time [s] [73] ; increasing the mA results in an increase in the quantity of radiation. Malicious manipulation of this parameter by targeted malware is very dangerous and may cause distorted or incorrect image results and radiation overdose to the patient, which may put the patient at risk. Attack 13 (Increase kilovoltage peak [kVp] [18, 58] ). Similar to Attack 14 (Radiation overdose [18, 58] ); however, this attack targets a specific parameter of the radiation. The kV p parameter determines the highest energy of X-ray photon, and the radiation dose to the patient is directly proportional to the square of kV p. Increasing the kV p will decrease the contrast seen between soft tissue and bone [74] . Malicious manipulation of this parameter by targeted malware is very dangerous and may cause distorted or incorrect image results as well as radiation overdose to the patient, which may put the patient at risk.
Attack 14 (Radiation overdose [18, 58] ). Similar to Attack 16 (Configuration file disruption [18, 58] ); however, this attack targets the radiation configurations directly. The implications of this attack are very dangerous, as it may cause radiation overdose to the patient, which may put the patient at risk. Furthermore, the attacker may increase the radiation dosage to amounts that are not immediately noticeable but could potentially increase the risk of the development of cancer in the future; this attack may affect many patients (i.e., scale) before it is discovered.
Attack 15 (Alteration of the IRS's output images [58] [59] [60] ). Similar to Attack 3 (Alteration of the imaging exam's results [58] [59] [60] ); however, this attack targets a different component (CAPEC 150): the IRS inside the CT, affecting the diagnosis of patients. In addition, this attack may affect many patients whose images were not yet sent to the PACS. It is also vulnerable to the same attacks as Attack 18.
Attack 16 (Configuration file disruption [18, 58] ). The entire CT scan operation is defined in the scan configuration file, inside the host control PC, making it extremely important. By manipulating the file, an attacker can change the CT's behavior. Moreover, the attacker can change the output commands directly for a similar effect. Targeted malware (CAPEC 542) resident on the host control PC can manipulate this file (CAPEC 165, CAPEC 75) to control the entire CT operation. Since the CT operation physically affects the patient, this attack also affects the patient in this way, as well as affecting the patient's diagnosis. In addition, misuse of the configurations may damage the MID. Since the attacker can manipulate configurations, which may not be noticeable immediately, this attack may affect many patients (i.e., scale) before it is discovered.
Attack 17 (Manipulation of CT calibration).
The CT is pre-calibrated so that it will work correctly. This attack attempts to manipulate this calibration and cause the device to use parameters with an offset (CAPEC 166). Incorrect calibration may damage the device, possibly destroying it and damaging the availability of the MID. Many people may use the CT with the wrong calibration before the problem is discovered. In addition, incorrect calibration of the device may result in misdiagnosis of the patient or radiation overdose (e.g., calibrating the radiation parameters to include a large offset in each scan).
Attack 18 (Disruption of the IRS's output images [58] ). Similar to Attack 8 (Disruption of the imaging exam's results [58] ); however, this attack targets a different component (CAPEC 150): the IRS inside the CT modality. This component is usually a standard Windows PC, and it is difficult to update it regularly since it runs the specific software of the manufacturer. This makes it very vulnerable to attacks, with a severity similar to Attack 8 (Disruption of the imaging exam's results [58] ).
Generic MRI Attacks.
Attack 19 (Overwhelm of the MRI's receiving coils with an overpowered magnetic field [18] ). Similar to Attack 16 (Configuration file disruption [18, 58] ); however, targeting the MRI receiving coils. A targeted malware (CAPEC 542) can create a powerful magnetic field by manipulating the scan configuration files (CAPEC 75 and CAPEC 165), which can damage the receiving coils and possibly cause damage to other electronics nearby that are sensitive to magnetic fields.
Attack 20 (Magnetic field disruption [18] ). Technically similar to Attack 19 (Overwhelm of the MRI's receiving coils with an overpowered magnetic field [18] ); however, this attack focus on disrupting output images. In addition to the attack patterns described in Attack 19, this attack may also use jamming of the RF signal (CAPEC 601). This attack may result in high RF radiation capable of causing heat burns to the patient and possible damage to the machine.
Attack 21 (External RF signal disruption). An attacker can position a strong RF antenna inside or close to the MRI's Faraday cage (e.g., position the antenna inside a truck and park the truck very close to the MRI room), which can interfere with the MRI's RF measures (CAPEC 601 and CAPEC 582). This can corrupt the exam's results and cause increased RF radiation, which may put the patient at risk. If such an antenna is covertly placed, this attack may affect many patients before it is discovered.
Attack 22 (Activate quenching of MRI [18] ). Similar to Attack 9 (Activate false safety alarms [18] ); however, specific to the MRI. MRI usually uses superconducting magnets, which use liquid hydrogen to maintain a low temperature. Quenching refers to a situation in which the temperature of the magnet suddenly rises (e.g., due to a fire or sudden release of the liquid hydrogen), which may be triggered by our new attack pattern CAPEC NEW: Manipulate Environment Hardware or Sensors. In such cases, there is a danger of asphyxia, hypothermia, and ruptured eardrums to the patient. In addition, quenching may take weeks to fix, affecting the availability of the MRI to many patients whose treatment may be delayed. This may also damage the device itself.
Generic Ultrasound Attacks.
Attack 23 (Disruption of MEMS components [61] ). Microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) are components consisting of microscopic devices with mechanical moving parts, widely used in a variety of devices and applications, including medical devices such as pacemakers and insulin pumps [75] . Since MEMS consists of mechanical moving parts, they are sensitive to interference caused by sound vibrations. At the Black Hat USA conference held in 2017 in Las Vegas, Pan et al. [61] demonstrated that ultrasound effects on devices with MEMS components could disrupt virtual reality devices and self-balancing vehicles (e.g., Segway). A targeted malware (CAPEC 542) can affect the ultrasound hardware directly (our new attack pattern CAPEC NEW: Manipulate Environment Hardware or Sensors) so that it acts similarly to that presented by Pan et al. [61] and disrupts MEMS components near or inside the patient, such as ICDs and insulin pumps, making these devices malfunction; this may be fatal; however, no such experiment has been performed to assess this threat.
Mapping the Discovered Attacks into Their Relevant CAPECs
In Table 2 , we present the results of our mapping of the discovered attacks into their relevant CAPECs (see §3.3). As we can see, we were able to map the 23 potential attacks into one or more of the following eight general CAPEC standard attack patterns and to an additional new attack pattern that we suggest adding: CAPEC 75 (Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files). An adversary manipulates configuration files that define how the system operates (e.g., the operation of the device during an imaging scan). This attack differs from CAPEC 165 as it does not attempt to cause improper behavior, but instead, it attempts to cause proper behavior for improper configurations.
CAPEC 150 (Collect Data from Common Resource Locations). An attacker easily accesses sensitive data stored in predefined or common resource locations (e.g., imaging results are saved in a default directory).
CAPEC 165 (File Manipulation
). An adversary attempts to cause the improper behavior of the system by modifying the content or attributes of files that the system processes (e.g., manipulate the image result of the imaging scan). This attack is commonly combined with CAPEC 150, which focuses on accessing the location of the files.
CAPEC 166 (Force the System to Reset Values). An attacker reconfigures the system to an initial state, possibly by using the system's existing reset functions (e.g., Windows restore), potentially allowing the attacker to bypass security (e.g., use default passwords) and disable services.
CAPEC 542 (Targeted Malware). An attacker develops a targeted malware, usually exploiting a vulnerability in the targeted system or the IT infrastructure (e.g., the WannaCry attack).
CAPEC 582 (Route Disabling). An attacker disrupts the network communication route (i.e., channel) between targets.
CAPEC 601 (Jamming). An attacker disrupts the communication using RF signals or illicit traffic, causing possible DoS 25 .
CAPEC 603 (Blockage). An attacker denies the system access or delivery of critical resources, causing a possible DoS attack.
In addition to the eight standard CAPEC attack patterns, we define and use a new attack pattern in the TLDR methodology, following the CAPEC format:
CAPEC NEW (Manipulate Environment Hardware or Sensors). Child of CAPEC 176 26 . An adversary interferes with various sensors of the system in an attempt to affect the system's behavior. E.g., an adversary may increase the temperature in the environment of the system in order to cause the temperature sensor to activate, affecting the system.
We suggest including CAPEC NEW in the official CAPEC ontology since we were unable to identify an existing attack pattern in the taxonomy that corresponds to this pattern.
Estimating the Likelihood of the Generic CAPECs
into Which the Potential Attacks Are Mapped In Table 3 , we present the results, in descending order, of our panel of four healthcare ISEs, each individually, CAPECs likelihood estimates (see § 3.4), which we use throughout the rest of the TLDR methodology. All experts had a similar level of expertise, each individually with over ten years of experience in the relevant field, CISOs of major HMOs; therefore, to obtain each value, we computed a simple mean of their answers. Note that the experts were not asked to map each attack into the relevant CAPECs; this was done by the authors.
Computing the CAPEC-Based Likelihood Estimates
for Each Attack In Table 2 , we present the computed CAPEC-based likelihood estimates for each attack, using the CAPEC likelihood estimates from Table 3 . The resulting likelihood estimates are higher by an average of 0.13 compared with the direct estimates (see § 4.10); thus, we have shifted the likelihood estimates by a constant of c = −0.13. 25 Denial of Service 26 https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/176.html 
Decomposing Each Attack into Several Severity Aspects and Assigning Them Weights
This step is beyond the scope of the current study (see § 3.6) and will be discussed in a separate paper that we are preparing.
Assessing the Magnitude of the Impact of Each of the Severity Aspects for Each Attack
In Table 2 , we present the results of the single-aspect severity assessments for each attack by our panel of four RMEs (see § 3.7). All experts had a similar level of expertise, each individually with over ten years of clinical experience in their relevant fields, heads of large hospitals' radiology departments; therefore, to obtain each value, we computed a simple mean of their answers. Since the current study focuses on the ontology-based Likelihood (L) part of the TLDR methodology, we simplified this process by using just the mean of the single-aspect severity assessments of our RMEs for each attack. In a separate paper, we discuss the severity Decomposition (D) part of the TLDR methodology and its validation.
Computing the Composite Severity Assessments for Each Attack
In the scope of the current study, this step is trivial (see § 3.8), since we only have single-aspect severity; thus, the composite severity assessments are simply the single-aspect severity assessments from § 4.7.
Integrating the Likelihood and Severity of Each Attack into Its Risk and Prioritizing It
Finally, in Table 2 , we integrated the risk for each attack by plugging into Equation (1) the CAPEC-based likelihood estimates (see § 4.5) and the composite severity assessments (see § 4.8).
Validating the TLDR Methodology's Results
We validated our results, following § 3.10, by following the same steps as the TLDR methodology; however, we asked the panel of healthcare ISEs to estimate also the direct overall likelihood for each attack individually, instead of using the TLDR methodology. We then defined two "consensus" vectors of the 23 potential attacks: (1) the Mean of the Experts' CAPEC-Based Likelihood Estimates (MECBLE) (computed indirectly), and (2) the Mean of the Experts' Direct-Likelihood Estimates (MEDLE). We demonstrated that we maintained the validity of the risk assessment process, by calculating the paired T -test statistic between the CAPEC-based (MECBLE) estimates and the direct ISEs' estimates, and showing that the null hypothesis is accepted (i.e., there was no significant difference between them). In Table 4 , we show that when we apply a constant shift of the CAPEC-based likelihood estimates, the results turn out to be significantly similar (the second-row (b)). This is expected due to the different scales that the two methods create. We demonstrated the value and the validity of using the TLDR methodology with respect to the relative ranking of the 23 potential threats, we calculated the pairwise Spearman's correlation between the CAPEC-based (MECBLE) likelihood estimates and the direct estimates of each of our ISEs and showed that the correlation is high, while the pairwise correlation between the mean of the direct estimates (the MEDLE) and each of the ISEs' overall direct estimates was lower. Note that we asked the ISEs to directly estimate the likelihood of each attack individually before we ask them to estimate it using the TLDR methodology to eliminate a potential biased point of reference. In Table 5 , we show that the healthcare ISEs seem to agree with the MECBLE on the CAPEC-based likelihood estimates, while two out of four ISEs did not agree with the MEDLE on the estimates of the direct likelihood (implying high variance between the correlations). Thus, we can imply that the CAPEC-based (MECBLE) likelihood estimates, using the TLDR methodology, are as valid as current direct risk assessment methodologies' likelihood estimates; however, the CAPEC-based likelihood estimates, computed from the mapped CAPECs, are much easier to calculate.
We also validated that the mapping of the discovered attacks into their relevant CAPECs indeed results in a mapping of many attacks into a significantly smaller number of just nine CAPECs. Also, we validated that using the AFDs helps discover new attacks, since we discovered eight new attacks after using this method.
Summary
In this study, we have presented the TLDR methodology for information security risk assessment for medical devices, its application to MIDs and the validation of its results correctness with the assistance of a panel of four senior healthcare ISEs, CISOs of major HMOs, and a panel of four senior RMEs, the heads of several large medical centers' imaging departments. We first presented the essential background on medical device security, information security risk assessment methodologies, CAPEC mechanisms of attacks, and MIDs. We have shown that nowadays, medical devices are facing many security challenges; however, it is difficult to accurately assess the risk of these challenges using current risk assessment methodologies, which are too general and do not seem to fit the unique medical domain. The application of the TLDR methodology to MIDs included: (1) identifying the potentially vulnerable components of MIDs by creating four AFDs for the generic MID, a generic CT, a generic MRI, and a generic ultrasound;
(2) identifying a total of 23 potential attacks on MIDs: 15 known attacks and eight new attacks that we discovered using the AFDs; (3) mapping of all 23 discovered attacks to just eight out of 517 existing CAPEC, and a new, 518 th , CAPEC attack pattern that we suggest adding; (4) estimating the likelihood of the nine generic CAPECs with the assistance of our panel of four senior healthcare ISEs and using these estimates to compute the CAPEC-based likelihood estimates of each attack; (5) computing, for all medical device attacks, the composite severity assessments of each attack with the assistance of a panel of four senior RMEs; and (6) integrating the likelihood and severity of each attack into its risk and prioritizing it.
We have shown that by using AFDs, we were able to discover eight new potential attacks on MIDs, in addition to the 15 known attacks. This implies that AFDs helps discover new attacks and shows the importance of initially identifying potentially vulnerable components.
We also validated that the mapping of the discovered attacks into their relevant CAPECs indeed results in a mapping of many attacks into a significantly smaller number of just nine CAPECs. Thus, it saves significant time and effort and leads to greater consistency in risk assessment.
We have suggested adding CAPEC NEW, the new CAPEC that we have defined, to the official CAPEC taxonomy since it may be relevant to other domains. It involves the manipulation of environment hardware or sensors as part of the attack pattern. Other potentially relevant domains might include operational technology or critical infrastructure domains that use devices that rely on such environment hardware or sensors.
Discussion
The analysis of the pairwise Spearman's correlation between the CAPEC-based (MECBLE) likelihood estimates and the direct estimates of each of our ISEs, had shown that the ISEs strongly agree with the MECBLE using the TLDR methodology while disagreeing with the mean of the direct estimates (the MEDLE). This shows that it is much easier for ISEs to reach a consensus when using the TLDR methodology. In fact, when the ISEs were asked to estimate the likelihood directly, they could not reach a consensus.
Moreover, we demonstrate, at least statistically, that by systematically decomposing and mapping the attacks into their relevant CAPEC standard attack patterns and estimating the likelihood of just these CAPECs with a panel of healthcare ISEs, we can reasonably accurately compute the likelihood estimates of all attacks; the CAPEC-based likelihood and risk correlated well with our panel of healthcare ISEs' direct individual attack estimates of the likelihood.
We have also shown that such ontology-based mapping of attacks is beneficial to the analysis of attacks on MIDs. The mapping of discovered attacks into a set of existing CAPECs enables us to exploit repeatedly the one-time likelihood estimates of these CAPECs in the medical (here, radiology) domain, and in some cases, even the default CAPECs likelihood estimates, to compute the CAPEC-based likelihood estimates of the new potential attacks. Unfortunately, not all of the mapped CAPECs that we found include a likelihood estimate in the official CAPEC ontology, thus we can use for now our CAPECs likelihood estimates instead, and perhaps update these estimates in the future, once the CAPEC ontology is updated.
The overall enumeration and charting, mapping into CAPECs, likelihood estimates, severity assessments, and overall risk integration, as defined in the TLDR methodology ( § 3), is potentially relevant to many other medical domains and devices, its application to MIDs in this study was given as a use case example. Such mapping could likely be beneficial to other medical devices as well since we did not base it on any MID-specific aspects.
Using the TLDR methodology implies that ISEs are used only for the qualitative phase of mapping potential attacks to CAPECs. Note that in most cases, mapping attacks to CAPECs is straightforward, and may be performed by a less experienced ISE. Once this relatively simple task is performed, we use the predefined likelihoods of the respective CAPECs. There is no need to ask the panel of ISEs for the quantitative estimates again.
Limitations
We used only four senior ISEs to directly estimate the likelihood of each of the 23 potential attacks, as well as the likelihood of the nine CAPECs into which these attacks were mapped. It is possible that using even more ISEs might modify the results, although the fact that even with four ISEs, it was possible to reach a reasonable [mean] consensus, seems to indicate that using a higher number is likely to further strengthen the results.
We applied the full TLDR methodology only to the radiology domain and to MIDs. Applying the methodology to other medical domains and additional medical devices in a future study is quite possible as well, to show that the TLDR methodology is useful in other medical domains and devices.
Conclusions
From the AFD of the generic MID, we can conclude that many high-risk attacks could be targeting it; thus, potentially affecting many MIDs. The host control PC, connected to the MIDs and the Internet (via hospital networks), is particularly vulnerable, poses many threats (e.g., sabotage, physical harm to patients), and is the most apparent initial entry point for attackers. The CT device itself is also very vulnerable and is potentially exposed to additional attacks that may cause direct harm to patients due to the use of ionizing X-ray radiation.
From our prioritization of risks, we can conclude that a ransomware attack (attack 1) poses the highest risk for a generic MID and the overall highest risk attack of all MIDs, followed by a disruption of patient-to-image linkage attack (attack 2) and an alteration of the imaging exam's results attack (attack 3). Furthermore, a radiation overdose attack (attack 14) poses the highest risk for a generic CT and an overwhelm of the MRI's receiving coils with an overpowered magnetic field attack (attack 19) poses the highest risk for a generic MRI.
This work reinforces our understanding that in order to better protect medical devices, it is necessary to start by correctly prioritizing the protection efforts through a consistent and accurate information security risk assessment of the potential threats, such as by using the TLDR methodology that we had proposed in this paper. Then, further research and development of detection and prevention techniques against attacks must be performed. Such techniques should be implemented both outside (e.g., through hospital networks) and inside medical devices ecosystems since each device can consist of an entire ecosystem of components, all of which must be better secured.
We hope that our work contributes to a better risk assessment of the risk to medical devices posed by cyber security threats. We consider it potentially valuable for researchers, healthcare organizations, hospitals, medical device manufacturers, and ISEs, leading to a prioritized assessment of the potential risks, followed by research and development of new defensive mechanisms. Indeed, we have already begun investigating several such means for mitigation of the potential attacks that we had discovered.
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